Gabriel Granato

Gabriel Granato

Ph.D. candidate in Business and Public Policy
Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley

On the 2026–2027 job market

My research lies at the intersection of development economics, political economy, and organizational economics. I study how leaders and informal institutions shape economic development and local governance where state reach is limited. Through field experiments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, I examine how ethnic ties and religious beliefs shape leaders’ influence on collective action, dispute resolution, and taxation.

Before Berkeley, I earned an M.Sc. in Economics from PUC-Rio and a B.A. in Economics from IBMEC.

Selected work in progress

Research →

Job market paper

Can Religion Bridge Ethnic Divides?
A Field Experiment on Leadership and Collective Action

With Elie Kabue Ngindu.

Abstract

Ethnic fragmentation is often associated with worse economic development. In one prominent mechanism, free-riding in heterogeneous societies undermines public good provision. This paper examines whether religious and ethnic leaders can sustain cooperation in a voluntary public-works program in an ethnically diverse city in the D.R. Congo. Residents are randomly assigned to ethnically homogeneous or mixed work teams that either include an ethnic chief, a pastor, or no leader at all. Chiefs increase work by 6.0 percentage points in homogeneous teams but not in mixed ones, while pastors increase work by 5.8 points in mixed teams but not in homogeneous ones. Heterogeneity by the strength of ethnic attachment explains this reversal. Chiefs still mobilize their coethnics on mixed teams, and on homogeneous teams their effect is concentrated among teams of residents who report a strong ethnic identity. Pastors do increase work on homogeneous teams whose members have weak ethnic attachments, and their effect is largest on mixed teams whose members hold strong but competing ethnic identities. A cross-randomized public disclosure intervention provides further evidence that the chief mobilizes labor contributions through social enforcement while the pastor uses internal incentives. The paper provides the first experimental evidence on how religious leaders can sustain voluntary public-goods provision in fragmented societies.

Residents gathered for an outdoor community meeting in Kananga, DRC.
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Work in progress

Formal and Informal Justice in a Fragile State

With Augustin Bergeron, Eva Davoine, Marina Mavungu Ngoma, James Robinson, and Jonathan Weigel.

Abstract

Can informal customary justice offer a more effective path to building legal capacity than formal legal institutions? The answer depends both on whether authorities can settle disputes at all and on whether justice provision is impartial. Experiences with justice allow citizens to learn about the authorities' competence to deliver settlements and also their willingness to promote just outcomes, potentially shaping their willingness to finance the state. We study these questions through a field experiment in Kananga, Democratic Republic of the Congo, randomly assigning registered disputes to free arbitration by customary chiefs, state-licensed lawyers, or a control group. We compare the two systems' ability to secure lasting settlements and restore social relations, using independent assessments of pre-arbitration accounts to identify when arbitrators unjustly favor someone from their own ethnic group. Cross-randomizations of written documentation and access to higher authorities allow us to examine which features contribute to their effectiveness. We then examine how experiences with arbitration shape perceptions of authorities' competence and impartiality and willingness to finance the state, using changes in beliefs and actual property-tax payments.

Officials outside the Provincial Ministry of Justice in Kasai-Central, DRC.

Work in progress

Is Pentecostalism Eroding Support for Redistribution in Africa?
Evidence from the DRC

With Clotaire Boyer and Jonathan Weigel.

Abstract

Why should the rich pay more? Preferences for redistribution depend on whether people view economic success as the reward for effort and merit or the result of luck and circumstances beyond individual control. An individual moral economy stresses personal responsibility for prosperity and giving back; a collective moral economy emphasizes unequal opportunities and shared responsibility for poverty. Religious traditions place different emphasis on these accounts, with potentially different implications for redistributive preferences. We study their implications in the context of a progressive taxation reform through a randomized experiment with churches in Kananga, Democratic Republic of the Congo. The tax administration asks pastors to relay property-tax information to their congregations. Pastors are randomly assigned to four groups: no materials; the request alone; the request with suggested sermons framing progressive taxation as an individual responsibility; or the request with sermons framing it as a collective responsibility. Pastors choose whether and how to convey these messages. Recorded sermons, congregant surveys, and administrative payment records measure message uptake, beliefs about poverty and wealth, support for progressive taxation and redistribution, and tax compliance. We test whether these appeals motivate citizens to finance the state and how their effectiveness varies with pastors' and congregants' religious beliefs.

Exterior of La Borne evangelical church.