Formal and Informal Justice in a Fragile State
Work in progress, 2025
With Augustin Bergeron, Eva Davoine, Marina Mavungu Ngoma, James Robinson, and Jonathan Weigel.
Abstract
Can informal customary justice offer a more effective path to building legal capacity than formal legal institutions? The answer depends both on whether authorities can settle disputes at all and on whether justice provision is impartial. Experiences with justice allow citizens to learn about the authorities' competence to deliver settlements and also their willingness to promote just outcomes, potentially shaping their willingness to finance the state. We study these questions through a field experiment in Kananga, Democratic Republic of the Congo, randomly assigning registered disputes to free arbitration by customary chiefs, state-licensed lawyers, or a control group. We compare the two systems' ability to secure lasting settlements and restore social relations, using independent assessments of pre-arbitration accounts to identify when arbitrators unjustly favor someone from their own ethnic group. Cross-randomizations of written documentation and access to higher authorities allow us to examine which features contribute to their effectiveness. We then examine how experiences with arbitration shape perceptions of authorities' competence and impartiality and willingness to finance the state, using changes in beliefs and actual property-tax payments.